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Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: 
Irrational Exuberance No More 
 
  One of the most striking results from experimental asset markets is the tendency of asset 
prices to bubble above fundamental value and subsequently crash.  Explaining the price pattern 
is a challenge.  Yet extreme price movements, at odds with any reasonable economic 
explanation, are documented throughout history.  Examples include the Dutch tulip mania (1634-
1637), the Mississippi bubble (1719-1720), and the stock market boom and crash of the 1920s 
(see e.g., Kindelberger (1989), Garber (1990), White (1990)).  More recently, in a speech made 
on December 5, 1996, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed concern that stock 
prices are inflated by “irrational exuberance.” 
  The current debate over rational valuation centers largely on internet-related companies.  
Though downward price adjustments have been observed of late, stock prices for many of these 
so-called dot-coms increased at incredible rates over the last decade despite mounting accounting 
losses.  Price to earnings multiples for some dot-coms (or price to revenues when earnings are 
negative) were as high as several hundred to one, something unheard of just ten years ago.  
Chairman Greenspan speculates that the observed price behavior might reflect a lottery effect.  
Market participants are willing to pay a premium for some stocks because, though the chance is 
small, a very significant payoff is possible.
1 
  This paper reports the results of experimental asset markets designed to examine whether 
asset prices reflect a lottery premium.  The results indicate that traders will pay a premium for a 
claim on a large payoff, even if the payoff is unlikely.  In addition, this study re-examines 
whether institutional design impacts upward deviations in prices from fundamental values.  









crashes are not observed when traders are not permitted to finance purchases with borrowed 
funds but are allowed to short sell the assets. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I provides background and 
motivation for the study.  Section II describes the experimental procedures and design.  Section 
III reports the results.  Section IV contains a discussion of the results and concluding remarks. 
 
I. Regularities, Institutional Features, and New Questions 
  Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) first reported bubbles in experimental asset 
markets.  Typically in bubbles markets, subjects trade an asset over a finite horizon.  The asset 
has a common dividend, determined at period end based on a known, stationary probability 
distribution.  Thus, fundamental value, assuming risk neutrality, is easily computed as the 
number of trading periods remaining multiplied by the expected dividend per period.  In this 
setting trading yields large upward deviations in prices from fundamental value followed by 
crashes back to the asset’s risk neutral value.  The finding has been replicated by Porter and 
Smith (1995), Ackert and Church (2000), and Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001), among others.  
King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) investigate whether bubbles are moderated by 
several treatment variables including the ability to short sell, margin purchases, the presence of 
brokerage fees, equal endowments across traders, a subset of informed traders, limit price change 
rules, design experience, and experience in the business world.  Only significant design 
experience (twice-experienced subjects) appears to temper the occurrence of bubbles. 
  The robustness of bubbles is perplexing and may result from perceived or observed 
irrationality.  Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (p. 1148) conclude that bubbles arise because of 









irrational and buy at prices above fundamental value if the trader believes that prices will 
continue to escalate, providing profitable resale opportunities.  In other words, traders perceive 
that others are irrational regardless of whether they are, in fact, irrational.  However, Lei, 
Noussair, and Plott report bubbles in markets in which speculation is not possible, suggesting 
that a subset of traders behaves irrationally.
2 
  What appears to be irrational valuation is also reported in naturally occurring markets.  
Many argue that instances of mispricing are abundant in today’s market for internet stocks.  
Shiller (2000) provides some examples of what he refers to as “obvious mispricing.”  He points 
out that eToys’ stock was worth $8 billion in 1999 when sales in 1998 were only $30 million and 
the company reported losses of $28.6 million.  By comparison, stock in Toys “R” Us was worth 
$6 billion when the company’s sales were $11.2 billion and profits were $376 million.  The 
market’s valuations appear to be incongruous with the performance of each company.  Yet, this 
price behavior may have a logical basis. 
  Gul (1991) proposes a model of preferences referred to as disappointment aversion.  His 
paradigm replaces the independence axiom of expected utility theory yet retains much of the 
insight of the standard theory.  In the standard expected utility framework, preferences display 
second-order risk aversion so that the risk premium is proportional to the variance of the gamble.  
In contrast, disappointment aversion utility displays first-order risk aversion and the risk 
premium is proportional to the standard deviation.  These preferences imply a sharp aversion to 
losses.
3  As Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) illustrate, asymmetry of value, or loss 
aversion, has been documented in many contexts.  An individual with disappointment aversion 
preferences is risk averse for gambles with a small probability of a large loss and risk-loving for 
gambles with a small probability of a large gain.









prefer and pay higher prices for assets with lottery-type payoffs (zero or a large, positive 
payoff).
5  In this paper we investigate whether behavior is consistent with a preference for 
lotteries so that an asset with lottery characteristics trades at a premium, as predicted by 
disappointment aversion. 
  Two assets trade simultaneously in our experimental asset markets, as described more 
fully in the following section of the paper.  The assets have equal expected payout but one has a 
highly positively skewed payoff distribution.  This asset has the characteristics of a lottery in that 
there is a small probability of a large gain, but most often no cash flow is generated.  If traders 
are risk-preferring for the lottery asset, it should trade at prices that reflect a lottery premium.  
This leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The price bubble is larger for an asset with lottery characteristics. 
 
  In addition to examining whether asset prices reflect a lottery premium, this study re-
examines whether bubbles are moderated by two institutional design features: (1) borrowing and 
(2) short-selling.  In some market sessions, traders may finance purchases of the two assets using 
borrowed funds and in others, traders are endowed with cash that they may keep.  In some 
market sessions, traders may short sell shares of either asset and in others, short sales are not 
permitted. 
  The ability to borrow in order to finance the purchase of a security is analogous to 
purchasing on margin.  Historically margin purchases were viewed as destabilizing.  In 1934 the 
U.S. Congress passed the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 which gave the Federal Reserve 









over-leveraging, excessive speculation, and increased stock market volatility.
6  In contrast, 
Kupiec (1998) argues that the evidence does not indicate that leverage created by margin 
produces excess volatility.  In terms of experimental evidence, Porter and Smith (1995) conclude 
that margin buying increases the amplitude of the price bubble in their experimental asset 
markets.
7 
  Traders in bubbles markets are typically endowed with cash or working capital, with the 
balance remaining at the conclusion of the experiment theirs to keep.  However, in other double 
auction asset markets, traders return the cash endowment (e.g., Sunder (1992)).  In such markets, 
trade is financed using borrowed money, or margin, at zero interest.  This design allows traders 
sufficient funds to trade as much as desired, yet limits the cost of the experiment to the 
researcher.  The impact of the difference in design has not been systematically examined despite 
the importance of endowment effects. 
  Prior experimental studies that examine the effect of margin buying on price bubbles 
typically endow traders with cash and provide a margin account.  The current study separates the 
two to isolate their potential effects.  In some markets, traders borrow money that is returned at 
the conclusion of the session.
8  In other markets, traders are endowed with money that is theirs to 
keep.  Distinguishing between borrowed and non-borrowed funds provides insight into the 
effects of traders’ endowments on the formation of price bubbles.  Recall from the earlier 
discussion that risk attitudes in the gain domain are different from those in the loss domain.  
Because of loss aversion, individual decision-making may differ substantially in a market setting 










  In our base case markets, traders finance purchases of the assets with borrowed money.  
We then examine market behavior when individuals trade using funds they do not have to return, 
their own money.  Because individuals tend to be more risk averse with money that is theirs, the 
bubble should be smaller when they cannot trade with borrowed funds.
9  Thus, the second 
hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If traders are not permitted to purchase assets with borrowed money, the price 
bubble will be dampened. 
 
  In addition to borrowing constraints, another important institutional feature is short sales 
restrictions.  In actual practice, few investors can short sell and obtain the full use of the 
proceeds.
10  Yet, short sellers perform an important function in an efficiently functioning market 
and short selling may be critical if assets are to be priced efficiently.
11  Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987), among others, show that the efficiency of the pricing mechanism is impaired by the 
market friction imposed by short sales constraints.  In the presence of short sales constraints, 
market participants use alternative mechanisms to move price toward equilibrium and 
incorporate information.  For example, Figlewski and Webb (1993) show that the ability to trade 
options contributes to the efficiency of the market by alleviating the effects of short sales 
constraints. 
  This study re-examines short sales constraints in an experimental asset market.  In 
naturally-occurring markets the practice of short-selling is possible because a trader who does 
not own a stock can borrow it.  The short seller does not ever actually own the stock.  If the stock 









this amount is then paid to the lender of the stock.  In our markets, short sellers effectively 
borrow stock from the experimenters.   
  King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) conclude that the ability to short sell 
fails to mitigate bubbles in their experimental asset markets.  However, this result is inconsistent 
with evidence from naturally-occurring markets and finance theory.  The implementation of the 
short sales feature here differs in three important ways from the approach chosen by King, 
Smith, Williams, and Van Boening.  In their markets, if a share was short sold and not returned 
at the end of the trading session, the trader received a penalty of one-half of the asset’s initial 
fundamental value.  Short sellers paid no dividends on borrowed shares and were permitted to 
short sell no more than two shares.  In our markets, no penalty is imposed if borrowed shares are 
not returned because the fundamental value of both assets is zero at the conclusion of the 
experiment.  However, short sellers pay all dividends on shares sold short.  In addition, we 
increase the number of shares that traders are can short sell.  Traders are permitted a short 
position of five shares in each asset at period end.  These three changes in institutional design 
better reflect actual practice and permit traders to exploit potentially profitable opportunities 
through short sales.  Because short selling allows traders to take advantage of imbalances in the 
market, the third hypothesis is expressed as follows. 
 










II. Experimental Method 
A. The computerized environment 
The asset market experiments were conducted in the Educational Trading Center at 
McMaster University using the Financial Trading System (FTS) platform developed by Sanjay 
Srivastava and John O’Brien at Carnegie Mellon University.  This computerized double auction 
market program allows students to transact in real time over a number of market periods.  
Participants can post bids and asks, or act as price-takers in accepting the best bids or asks posted 
by others.  After the setting of initial parameters, the FTS program allows traders to begin with 
endowments made up of cash and securities and automatically updates portfolios after 
transactions and dividend payments.  The order book was assigned a depth of one so that posted 
orders were erased by better bids and asks.  Traders were permitted to transact each asset one 
unit at a time.   
 
B. Nature of the experiments 
Thirteen market sessions were conducted, in addition to four pre-tests.  The experimental 
design, to be discussed subsequently, is summarized in Table 1.  Between seven and nine traders 
participated in each session which consisted of 12 five-minute periods.  All participants were 
sophomore, junior, or senior undergraduate business or economics students.  All were 
inexperienced in that none had participated in an earlier session. 
Subjects were endowed with two shares each of two securities, referred to in the sessions 
as stocks A and B.  Here we will refer to them as the standard asset and the lottery asset.  At the 
end of each period, the assets paid dividends, which were randomly determined by the FTS 









intertemporally independent.  Note that although the spreads of the distributions are quite 
different, the expected dividend for both stocks is identical at $0.72 per period.  Most often the 
lottery asset’s dividend is zero but there is a small chance (4%) of a large payoff ($18).  With 12 
periods, both assets have an initial fundamental value of 12 x 0.72 = $8.64.  With an endowment 
of two units of each asset, all traders had a total initial expected dividend payout of $34.56.  
After the final dividends were paid at the end of period 12, shares ceased to exist and had zero 
value. 
As Table 1 details, three treatments were used: no short selling plus borrowing (NSS/B); 
no short selling plus no borrowing (NSS/NB); and short selling coupled with no borrowing 
(SS/NB).
12  Sessions NSS/B1-4 correspond to the borrowed funds/no short selling treatment 
(NSS/B).  Participants were endowed with $100 in cash at the beginning of trading which had to 
be returned at the end of trading.  If the final cash balance was below $100, trading profit was $0.  
Sessions NSS/NB1-5 removed the borrowed funds condition while maintaining no short selling 
(NSS/NB).  This was effected by endowing each trader with $40 of cash that did not have to be 
returned (in addition to the two shares of the standard asset and two of the lottery asset).  
Sessions SS/NB1-4 removed both the borrowed funds and the no short selling conditions 
(SS/NB).  Short sold shares are not borrowed from other traders but rather from the “market.”  A 
trader in a short position at the end of a period is required to pay out the relevant dividend.  At 
the end of period 12 after the final dividend is paid out, all shares are worthless because no 
further dividends are to be paid.  In sessions with short selling, a short position limit of five per 
security at period end was imposed.   
Because subjects’ price predictions may provide insight into market behavior, 









recorded their forecasts of each asset’s closing price for the coming period on price prediction 




C. Conduct of sessions 
  Sessions NSS/B1-4 and NSS/NB1-5 required roughly two and one-half hours.  On arrival 
subjects were handed envelopes containing a set of instructions and 12 price prediction tickets.
14  
They were given about 20 minutes to read through them.  Thereafter one of the experimenters 
did an extensive recap while addressing all procedural and technical questions.  This took 
roughly another 20 minutes.  A further five minutes was allotted for consideration of strategy, 
pricing and prediction, whereupon subjects were asked to fill out the first price prediction ticket.  
After the tickets were collected, trading commenced.  At the end of each trading period, four 
items of information (per security) were announced and publicly recorded, namely the closing 
price (assuming a trade occurred), dividend, expected total remaining dividends, and maximum 
total remaining dividends (the maximum dividend per period multiplied by the number of 
periods remaining).  Then about one minute was provided for subjects to consider and record 
their next price predictions, after which the next period commenced.  Sessions SS/NB1-4 were 
conducted in a like manner except that extra time was provided to the participants for instruction 
due to the additional complexity of short selling. 
After the final dividends were paid, the final cash balance was (privately) displayed on a 
subject’s computer screen.  For Sessions NSS/B1-4, a traders’ profit was the maximum of zero 
and the final cash balance less the cash endowment of $100.  For Sessions NSS/NB1-5 and 
SS/NB1-4 the final cash balance represented trading profit.









experiment questionnaire that elicited potentially relevant subject attributes such as sex, 
educational background, economic status, and reactions to the experiment.  During this time the 
experimenters ascertained the winner of the price prediction bonus.  Thereupon the 
experimenters (rounding up to the nearest dollar) filled envelopes with the appropriate amount of 
cash and called each subject forward (privately) to check and receive his/her cash before filling 
out a receipt and leaving the room.
16  Median (mean) total compensation in Canadian dollars 
over the thirteen sessions was $60.92 ($61.00) with a range of $0 to $148.00. 
   
III. Market Behavior 
A. Results for the NSS/B Sessions 
  Figures 1 and 2 show the median transaction price per period for the standard and lottery 
assets, respectively, in markets NSS/B1-4, along with the assets’ fundamental value.  In this 
treatment, neither asset could be sold short and participants were permitted to finance trade with 
borrowed funds.  Consistent with earlier research, prices clearly exhibit substantial deviation 
from fundamental value.   
  Figure 1 shows that the price of the standard asset does not appear to settle close to the 
fundamental value until the final periods of trading.  The price paths exhibit large run-ups from 
(declining) fundamental value and do not crash back to the risk-neutral valuation until periods 
11-12.  Prices reach levels far from fundamental value.  For example, in period 3 of market 3 the 
median transaction price was $12.50 when the fundamental value of the asset was $7.20.  In 
period 7 of market 2 the median price was $11.85 when the fundamental value was $4.32.   
  Figure 2 shows similar price paths for the lottery asset, with large deviations in prices 









consistent with the first hypothesis: the price bubble is larger for a security with lottery 
characteristics.  For example, in period 3 of market 3 the median price was $16.75 when the 
fundamental value was $7.20.  In period 7 of market 4 the median price was $14.49 when the 
asset’s fundamental value was $4.32.   
  Table 3 reports the frequency of transactions that occur in various price ranges, including 
prices less than the minimum possible dividend payout (p < min D), between the minimum 
payout and the fundamental value (min D £ p < FV), between the fundamental value and the 
maximum possible dividend payout (FV £ p £ max D), and greater than the maximum possible 
payout (max D < p).  For the standard asset, a significant volume of trade occurs at prices outside 
the feasible range of possible future dividends.  Consistent with the results of Lei, Noussair, and 
Plott (2001), nearly one-half of trades (48%) occur at prices less than the minimum possible or 
greater than the maximum possible dividend stream.  For the lottery asset, we observe no trades 
outside the feasible bound because trading below the minimum possible price would require 
trade at negative prices and trading above the maximum possible price would require prices that 
exceed even unreasonable limits.
17  For both assets the volume of trade is concentrated at prices 
above fundamental value, rather than below.  For the standard asset (lottery asset), 86% (91%) of 
transactions occur at prices above the risk-neutral valuation. 
  Table 4 reports several summary statistics on the deviations in price from fundamental 
value: the number of periods in which the median price exceeds the fundamental value, positive 
duration, peak deviation, average absolute price deviation, average price deviation, and average 
positive price deviation.  These empirical measures assume risk neutrality and are designed to 
gauge the bubble in asset price, if one is observed, and to facilitate comparison across assets and 
treatments.









increases relative to fundamental value subject to the constraint that the increase produces a price 
that exceeds fundamental value, and is calculated as 
max[m: Pt – FVt < Pt+1 – FVt+1 < … < Pt+m – FVt+m] s.t. Pt+1 > FVt+1 
where Pt is the median price and FVt is the fundamental value in period t (t = 1, …, 12).  Peak 
deviation measures the magnitude of the bubble using peak deviations in the median price from 
fundamental value, the maximum of [(Pt – FVt)/FV1], where the deviation in price from 
fundamental value is normalized by the total expected dividend value over the life of the asset, 
FV1.  The average (absolute) price deviation is the average of the (absolute) deviation in the 
median price from fundamental value, normalized by the fundamental value (FVt).  Finally, the 
average positive price deviation is the average of all deviations in the median price above 
fundamental value, i.e., the average of the maximum of zero and the price deviation.  Because 
this statistic focuses on price deviations above fundamental value, it gives another measure of the 
size of the price bubble. 
  For the first treatment (NSS/B1-4), the statistics reported in Table 4 are consistent with 
the hypothesis that the price bubble is larger for the lottery asset.  The price of the lottery asset 
more often exceeds the fundamental value than does the standard asset’s price.  Positive duration 
is higher for the lottery asset (5.00), as compared to the standard asset (4.50), suggesting that 
upward price deviations from fundamental value are more persistent for the lottery asset.  In 
addition, the peak price movement above fundamental value is larger, on average, for the lottery 
asset (0.9327), as compared to the standard asset (0.7557). 
  For each asset Table 4 also reports the average absolute, average, and average positive 
price deviation from fundamental value, normalized by the fundamental value.  In all three cases 









average median price deviation from fundamental value for the lottery asset is 1.6901, whereas 
for the standard asset it is 1.1444.  To formally test for a difference across the two assets, we 
used nonparametric Wilcoxon matched pairs tests of the hypothesis that the price of the lottery 
asset deviates more from fundamental value than does the price of the standard asset.  The lottery 
asset’s price deviation from fundamental value is significantly larger (at the 1% level) using all 
three measures of price deviation.  This provides support for the hypothesis that individuals will 
pay a premium for an asset with lottery characteristics.   
   
B. Results for the NSS/NB Sessions 
  In the next set of sessions, participants were not permitted to finance trade with borrowed 
funds.  Thus, margin purchases were not permitted and participants used their own funds to buy 
shares.  Again, neither asset could be sold short.  Figures 3 and 4 show the median asset price per 
period for the standard and lottery assets, respectively, in markets NSS/NB1-5, along with the 
assets’ fundamental value.  As in the first set of markets, price deviates substantially from 
fundamental value.  Prices do not appear to settle down to fundamental value until very late in 
trading.  Importantly, the bubbles do not appear to be magnified for the lottery asset, as 
compared to the standard asset. 
  The frequency of trades in various price ranges, reported in Table 3, again suggest that 
some irrational trades occur.  For the standard asset, 35% of the trades are at prices less than the 
minimum possible or greater than the maximum possible dividend payout.  For both assets, more 
transactions are at prices above fundamental value with 78% (71%) of trades above the risk-









trades and the frequency of trades above fundamental value are observed in the NSS/NB1-5 
sessions as compared to the NSS/B1-4 sessions. 
  Bubble measures reported in Table 4 indicate that bubbles are also reduced in the 
NSS/NB1-5 sessions, compared to the NSS/B1-4 sessions.  The median price exceeds 
fundamental value in fewer periods.  Positive duration for both assets is lower when borrowing is 
not permitted.  The peak price deviation is also lower, indicating that the bubble is moderated 
when traders must finance their own trades. 
  As Table 4 reports, the average price deviations (absolute, average, and positive) from 
fundamental value for the lottery asset are smaller than those of the standard asset.  When traders 
must finance asset purchases themselves, they will not pay a premium for an asset with lottery 
characteristics.  This result is contrary to the first hypothesis. 
 
C. Results for the SS/NB Sessions 
  In the next set of sessions, participants were permitted to short sell both assets.  Figures 5 
and 6 show the median asset price per period for the standard and lottery assets, respectively, in 
markets SS/NB1-4, along with the assets’ fundamental value.  The price paths contrast sharply 
with those observed in markets that do not allow short selling.  Large run-ups with crashes back 
to fundamental value are generally not observed.  Instead, in many markets trading below 
fundamental value is observed for both assets. 
  As in the first two treatments, the frequency of trades in various price ranges, reported in 
Table 3, suggests that many irrational trades occur.  For the standard asset, 45% of the trades are 
at prices less than the minimum possible or greater than the maximum possible dividend stream.  









at prices below fundamental value with 50% (63.9%) of trades below the risk-neutral valuation 
for the standard (lottery) asset.  
  Bubble measures reported in Table 4 provide further evidence that short selling 
moderates price bubbles.  Comparing sessions SS/NB1-4 to NSS/NB1-5, there are fewer periods 
in which the median price exceeds fundamental value.  Positive duration and the peak price 
deviations are also substantially lower for both assets with short selling. 
  As Table 4 reports, the average price deviations (absolute, average, and positive) from 
fundamental value are larger for the standard asset as compared to the lottery asset.  The average 
price of the lottery asset is below the fundamental value, rather than above it.  When traders can 
short sell, the asset with lottery characteristics trades at a discount, contrary to the first 
hypothesis. 
 
D. Comparisons Across Treatments 
  Figure 7 summarizes asset price behavior across all 14 sessions.  The figure shows the 
average of the median asset price per period for each treatment and asset.  Consistent with the 
results reported above, traders may pay a premium for an asset with lottery characteristics.  
However, price deviations from fundamental value are moderated when traders must finance 
their own trade and short sales are permitted.   
  To more formally examine the effects of the treatments on deviations in prices from 
fundamental value, a time series, cross-sectional regression method is used.  Each market is a 
cross-sectional unit consisting of 12 time series observations.  Ordinary least squares is 









components model is an alternative approach in this pooled setting.  This model assumes that the 
regression disturbance, ei,t, is composed of three terms 
ei,t =  ui+ vt + wi,t 
where ui is the cross-sectional error component, vt is the time-series error component, and wi,t is 
the residual error.  Each component is normally distributed and ei,t is homoskedastic.  The best 
linear unbiased estimator is the two-step generalized least squares estimator (Fuller and Battese 
(1973, 1974)). 
  For each asset, Panel A of Table 5 reports the estimation results of the error components 
model.  The dependent variable is the normalized median price deviation from fundamental 
value each period.
19  The independent variables include two dummy variables.  The first dummy 
variable measures the effect of the ability to borrow (DB) where the dummy takes the value of 
one when borrowing is permitted.  The second measures the effect of the ability to short sell 
(DSS) where the dummy takes the value of one when short selling is permitted.  The p-values are 
reported in parentheses below parameter estimates.   
  Panel B of Table 5 reports t-statistics for paired treatment comparisons, with p-values 
below in parentheses.
20  For the standard asset, only the combined effect of borrowing 
restrictions and the ability to short sell moderates the price deviation from fundamental value.  
For the lottery asset, both borrowing restrictions and the ability to short sell significantly reduce 
price deviations.  These results provide weak evidence for the second hypothesis: the price 
bubble is dampened if traders cannot purchase assets with borrowed money.  The price bubble is 
moderated when a borrowing constraint is imposed for the asset with lottery characteristics, 
though not for the standard asset.  The results provide evidence to support the third hypothesis 









significant impact on price deviations from fundamental value for the lottery asset, but not for 
the standard asset.  However, for both assets, the ability to short sell combined with restrictions 
on the ability to borrow are critical to driving price to fundamental value.  The price bubble is 
dampened if traders are not permitted to purchase assets with borrowed money and if short sales 
are permitted.  Thus, institutional design features need to be considered in combination. 
  To provide further insight into market behavior, we examine how individual behavior 
translates into market performance.  For each treatment, Table 6 reports the results of a 
regression of normalized trading profit for each individual on forecast accuracy (accuracy) and 
the percentage of rational trades (%rational).  The dependent variable is an individual’s trading 
profit over the session normalized by the payout that would have accrued had the trader followed 
a no trade strategy of holding the initial endowment.  Forecast accuracy is the absolute value of 
the difference between a trader’s forecast of the closing price and the closing price, scaled by the 
session’s average absolute forecast error.
21  The percentage of rational trades is calculated as the 
number of purchases at prices below fundamental value plus the number of sales above 
fundamental value, divided by the total number of trades.
22   
  The accuracy variable is insignificant in all treatment regressions, as well as the overall 
sample.  Forecasting ability does not translate into superior profit-making ability.  Consistent 
with the conclusions of Ackert and Church (2000), pricing efficiency does not hinge on 
forecasting ability.  However, in all three treatments, individuals who make more rational trades 
generate greater trading profit.  Traders who buy and sell when the relationship between the price 
and fundamental value warrants it, perform better in the experiment. 
  Competently taking advantage of the ability to short sell also translates into higher 









For the treatment in which short sales are permitted (SS/NB1-4), the table reports the results of a 
regression of normalized trading profit on forecast accuracy (accuracy), the percentage of 
rational trades excluding short sales (%rational(XSS)), and the percentage of rational short sales 
(%rational(SS)) times a dummy (DSS) that takes the value of one when a trader short sells at 
least one share.  Profit and forecast accuracy are as defined above.  The percentage of rational 
trades excluding short sales is the number of purchases at prices below fundamental value plus 
the number of sales above fundamental value, divided by the total number of trades, excluding 
any short sales. The percentage of rational short trades is calculated as the number of short sales 
above fundamental value, divided by the total number of short sales.  The percentages of rational 
trades excluding short sales and of rational short sales are both significant determinants of 
trading profit.  Individuals who make more rational trades and those who short sell when they 
should generate greater trading profit. 
 
IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
  This paper reports the results of experimental asset markets in which market participants 
traded two assets.  Consistent with previous research, this paper documents the tendency of asset 
prices to bubble above and crash back to fundamental value in markets for finitely-lived assets.  
The paper also documents that traders will pay even higher prices for an asset with lottery 
characteristics, i.e., a claim on a large, unlikely payoff.  But, the tendency to pay too much 
disappears when traders must finance purchases of the assets themselves and are permitted to 
short sell.   
  Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) provide a methodological explanation for bubbles 









experiment are expected to trade, much of the activity that results in bubbles comes from the fact 
that participants have nothing else to occupy them.  A high volume of trade provides support for 
the hypothesis.  The volume of trade in the markets described in this paper is also large, though 
the results are not necessarily consistent with the active participation hypothesis.  When margin 
purchases are constrained and participants can exploit potentially profitable opportunities 
through short selling, price bubbles are moderated.  Yet turnover and volume are higher than 
with other institutional designs (see Table 3).  At least some participants trade to take advantage 
of arbitrage opportunities. 
  Short selling provides an equilibrating force in the market.  Those who excel at it 
generate greater profit.  For an asset with lottery characteristics, short selling is critical to move 
price toward fundamental value.  For an asset with a less skewed payoff, restrictions on 
borrowing to finance trade combined with short selling temper price bubbles. 
  The results of this study have important implications for the regulation of security 
markets.  Those who oversee these markets are advised to carefully consider any constraints on 
the ability to short sell.  Allowing short selling enhances the pricing mechanism and allows 
traders to move price to levels justified by fundamentals.  At the same time, market regulators 
should give serious thought to any proposal to ease margin requirements.  Our results suggest 

















































































































































































































































































Endowment  Session  Treatment








Borrowing  Short 
Selling 
1  8  2  2  $100  Yes  No 
2  9  2  2  $100  Yes  No 




9  2  2  $100  Yes  No 
1  7  2  2  $40  No  No 
2  9  2  2  $40  No  No 
3  7  2  2  $40  No  No 




9  2  2  $40  No  No 
1  7  2  2  $40  No  Yes 
2  9  2  2  $40  No  Yes 




9  2  2  $40  No  Yes 
 










Distributions of Dividends 
 
 







Probability  0.48  0.48   0.04 
Standard asset’s 
dividends 
0.50  0.90   1.20 
Lottery asset’s 
dividends 






Notes: The fundamental value in period 1 is the expected dividend per period multiplied by the 













Panel A:  Standard asset 
Treatment   
NSS/B1-4  NSS/NB1-5  SS/NB1-4 




























231  280 
Turnover 
 
2.99  2.75  3.99 
 
Panel B:  Lottery asset 
Treatment   
NSS/B1-4  NSS/NB1-5  SS/NB1-4 




























150  202 
Turnover 
 
2.14  1.84  2.88 
 
Notes: For each asset, the table reports the number of transactions at prices less than the 
minimum possible dividend payout (p < min D), between the minimum payout and the 
fundamental value (min D £ p < FV), between the fundamental value and the maximum possible 
dividend payout (FV £ p £ max D), and greater than the maximum possible payout (max D < p).  
The table also reports the total number of transactions and turnover, which is the normalized 
volume of trade. 












Panel A:  Standard asset 
Treatment   
NSS/B1-4  NSS/NB1-5  SS/NB1-4 
Periods when  
median Pt > FVt 
10.7500  9.6000  6.0000 
Positive Duration 
 
4.5000  2.8000  1.5000 
Peak Deviation 
 
0.7557  0.6894  0.2473 
Average Absolute Price 
Deviation 
1.2074  0.9399  0.4037 
Average Price Deviation 
 
1.1444  0.8543  0.0518 
Average Positive Price 
Deviation 
1.1759  0.8971  0.2278 
 
Panel B:  Lottery asset 
Treatment   
NSS/B1-4  NSS/NB1-5  SS/NB1-4 
Periods when  
median Pt > FVt 
11.5000  8.2000  2.5000 
Positive Duration 
 
5.0000  3.6000  1.0000 
Peak Deviation 
 
0.9327  0.8735  0.3225 
Average Absolute Price 
Deviation 
1.7029  0.8520  0.3720 
Average Price Deviation 
 
1.6901  0.6735  -0.2376 
Average Positive Price 
Deviation 
1.6965  0.7627  0.0672 
 
Notes: The table reports the number of periods in which the median price (Pt) exceeds the 
fundamental value (FVt).  Positive duration is the number of consecutive periods with price 
increases relative to fundamental value subject to the constraint that the increase produces a price 
that exceeds fundamental value.  Peak deviation measures the magnitude of the bubble using the 
normalized peak deviation in price from fundamental value (maximum observed (Pt - FVt)/FV1).  
The average absolute and average price deviations measure price departures from fundamental 
value (FVt).  The average positive price deviation is the average deviation in price above 










The Effects of the Treatments on Deviations from Fundamental Value 
 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates and p-values 

















2  0.03 
 
0.08 





Panel B: Treatment Comparisons 

















Notes: For each asset, Panel A of the table reports the estimation results for an error components 
model.  The dependent variable is the normalized price deviation from fundamental value.  The 
independent variables include two dummy variables.  The first measures the effect of the ability 
to borrow (DB) where the dummy takes the value of one when borrowing is permitted. The 
second measures the effect of the ability to short sell (DSS) where the dummy takes the value of 
one when short selling is permitted.  The p-values are reported in parentheses below parameter 
estimates.  In Panel B the table reports t-statistics for paired treatment comparisons, with p-











The Determinants of Trading Profit 
 
Treatment   
NSS/B1-4  NSS/NB1-5  SS/B1-4 
Overall 

























2  0.63 
 
0.42  0.36  0.35 









Notes: For each treatment, the table reports the results of a regression of normalized profit on 
forecast accuracy (accuracy) and the percentage of rational trades (%rational).  Normalized profit 
is a trader’s profit over the session normalized by the payout that would have accrued had the 
trader followed a no trade strategy of holding the initial endowment.  Forecast accuracy is the 
absolute value of the difference between a trader’s forecast of the closing price and the closing 
price, scaled by the session’s average absolute forecast error.  The percentage of rational trades is 
calculated as the number of purchases at prices below fundamental value plus the number of 












Effect of Short Sales on Trading Profit 
 
Treatment  SS/NB1-4 
Constant  -0.6631 
(0.165) 
Accuracy  0.5063 
(0.085) 
%rational(XSS)  1.8425 
(0.001) 
%rational(SS)*DSS  0.6461 
(0.011) 
R
2  0.44 
 
F-statistic  7.89 
(0.001) 
 
Notes: For the treatment in which short sales are permitted, the table reports the results of a 
regression of normalized payout on forecast accuracy (accuracy), the percentage of rational 
trades excluding short sales (%rational(XSS)) and the percentage of rational short sales 
(%rational(SS)) times a dummy (DSS) that takes the value of one when a trader short sells at 
least one share.  Profit is a trader’s profit over the session normalized by the payout that would 
have accrued had the trader followed a no trade strategy of holding the initial endowment.  
Forecast accuracy is the absolute value of the difference between a trader’s forecast of the 
closing price and the closing price, scaled by the session average absolute forecast error.  The 
percentage of rational trades excluding short sales is calculated as the number of purchases at 
prices below fundamental value plus the number of sales above fundamental value, divided by 
the total number of trades, excluding any short sales. The percentage of rational short trades is 
calculated as the number of short sales above fundamental value, divided by the total number of 
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1  For a summary of Chairman Greenspan’s remarks, see Mufson and Berry (1999). 
2  In some of Lei, Noussair, and Plott’s markets, traders were buyers or sellers so that they could 
not buy with the intention of re-selling later. 
3  Gul’s theory is not the first to model loss aversion.  Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect 
theory defines utility asymmetrically over losses and gains.  Andrew Ang, Bekaert, and Liu 
(2000) detail the advantages of disappointment aversion over prospect theory.  The theory of 
disappointment aversion compares gains and losses to a reference point that is endogenously 
determined. 
4  Standard preferences are a special case of disappointment aversion preferences.  If individuals 
are disappointment averse, asymmetry over gains and losses results. 
5  Such behavior is also predicted by Kahneman and Tversky’s rank-dependent prospect theory 
(1992).   
6  Simon and Ewing (2000) argue that purchasing stock on margin can magnify an investor’s risk 
and return.  The effect of margin requirements in derivative securities markets is also debated.  
For example, Weber (2000) expresses concern about margin requirements in futures markets. 
7  In addition, King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) report that margin buying 
increases price bubbles in some markets.   
8  Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) conduct several markets in which participants finance trade 
with borrowed funds.  However, the potential effect of borrowing on market behavior is not part 
of their experimental design and, thus, is not systematically examined. 
9 In our experiments, if a trader cannot return the borrowed funds at the conclusion of a trading 
session because his final cash balance is too low, trading profit is zero.  Thus, it is possible for a 
trader to perceive that liability is limited.  However, as in naturally occurring markets, 
bankruptcy is a real possibility.   
10  Brokers commonly impose short-selling restrictions.  Ironically, while this research was in 
progress and prior to the publication of Shiller’s book, a colleague of one of the authors 
attempted to short-sell stock in eToys.  Believing it was surely over-priced the colleague decided 
to take action.  However, his brokerage firm (a large, well known, firm with a national 
reputation) refused his request despite his good standing.  Apparently, this stock was included on 
a list of stocks the firm would not allow even good clients to short sell.  Of course, it may have 
been difficult for the brokerage to borrow shares of the stock if none were available in margin 
accounts. 
11  Short sellers are viewed with suspicion by other investors.  In a 1996 Business Week article, 
short sellers are described as “mudslingers” and the “assassins of Corporate America” (Weiss 
(1996)).  A more recent Wall Street Journal article notes that “shorts are reviled for profiting 
from other investors’ misery” (Gasparino and McGough (2000)). 
12  Fine-tuning, additional clarification, and substantial changes were made in the instructions 
throughout pre-tests.  In addition, significant procedural changes were made so the results of pre-
tests are not presented. In one pre-test, subjects were not paid for their participation.  In another, 
the order book depth was ten so that a bettered bid/ask stayed on the order book.  In all other 
sessions depth was reduced from ten to one.  This substantive procedural change was made to 
simplify matters for the participants who seemed to be confused by the order book.  In two pre-
test sessions, it became clear that the concept of short-selling was also difficult for participants to 










the experimenters devoted additional time to discussion of short-selling.  In addition, to mitigate 
the bankruptcy risk inherent in short-selling, limits were placed on the number of shares that 
could be short sold and an ad hoc solvency check was instituted for traders with negative cash 
balances.  These subjects’ positive share holdings had to be sufficient to cover the negative cash 
balance, and failing that, no further trades were permitted. 
13 When no trade occurred in a period, the previous period’s close was used.  If this happened in 
the first period, this prediction was omitted from consideration. 
14 The instructions and experimental data are available from the authors upon request.  In 
addition to the price prediction tickets, the envelopes contained a brief introduction to the 
session, a consent form, a post-experiment questionnaire, and a “price tracking sheet” which was 
a blank table that allowed subjects, if desired, to record closing prices and personal predictions. 
15 One trader in session SS/NB5 had a negative balance at the end of period 12.  The negative 
balance resulted from paying dividends on shares sold short.  This individual’s trading profit was 
set to zero.  
16 In addition, there were several small bonuses and/or penalties.  Traders arriving on time 
received a $2 bonus, and those who agreed to fill out the questionnaire also received a $2 bonus.  
One trader declined to complete the questionnaire.  Further, a $5 penalty was levied on all those 
posting orders for more than a single share and for short positions in excess of five (during 
sessions SS/NB1-4). 
17  For example, exceeding the maximum possible price in period 1 would require trades above 
$216.00 when the fundamental value is $8.64. 
18  These bubbles measures differ from those proposed in other studies.  For example, typically 
duration is calculated as the number of consecutive periods with price increases relative to 
fundamental value.  If the price is below fundamental value, this measure includes a price 
movement toward fundamental value as evidence of persistence in a bubble.  Yet, clearly such an 
observation does not provide evidence of a price bubble. 
19  Inferences are similar to those reported subsequently if the dependent variable is defined as 
the absolute price deviation or as the average positive price deviation.  Recall that the latter 
definition focuses on periods in which price exceeds fundamental value. 
20  Note that the p-value for the NSS/B vs. NSS/NB comparison is identical to the p-value for the 
DB coefficient.  This is because the latter coefficient constitutes an intercept shift associated with 
a move from NSS/NB to NSS/B.  Similarly, the p-value for the NSS/NB vs. the SS/NB 
comparison is identical to the p-value for the DSS coefficient.   
21  Average absolute forecast error is a natural scaling variable because of its link to participants’ 
compensation.  A $20 bonus was paid to the participant in each session with the smallest total 
absolute prediction error. 
22  Clearly this measure of rational trading activity is imperfect.  One can envision trades that are 
irrational and yet classified as rational, or rational trades classified as irrational.  For example, it 
may be rational to buy above fundamental value in the belief that others will continue to bid the 
price up (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988).  On the other hand, selling below fundamental 
value may be rational for a trader with a sufficiently high level of risk aversion.  Nevertheless, 
we utilize this measure because of its simplicity.   